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Has County Sanitation District (No. 2) v. Los Angeles
County Employees Association Trashed the Traditional
Prohibitions Upon Public Sector Strikes?
Until recently, the majority of courts in this country regularly found
public sector strikes contrary to the common law.' In 1985, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court concluded that the common law prohibitions against
public sector strikes should no longer be recognized in that state. This
decision, County Sanitation District (No. 2) v. Los Angeles County Employees
Association,2 also raised several constitutional considerations to justify
public sector strikes. The question remains whether this decision rests
on solid theoretical foundations.
Part I of this note examines the common law principles prohibiting
public sector strikes. Part II discusses whether recent case law has
eroded these traditional common law justifications. Part III surveys and
evaluates several constitutional arguments initially proposed fifteen years
ago by Judge Skelly Wright in a concurring opinion3 and more fully ex-
plicated by ChiefJustice Bird4 in her concurring opinion in County Sanita-
tion. Part IV concludes that neither the expansive growth of government
into areas considered by some to be nontraditional nor our rapidly
changing socio-economic situation has eroded the traditional common
law prohibitions, and further suggests that the right to strike does not
emanate from enumerated constitutional rights.
I. Common Law Principles Prohibiting Public Sector Strikes
The justifications advanced to support the common law bar to public
sector strikes can be summarized by four arguments. The principal justi-
fication states that a strike by public employees constitutes a denial of
governmental authority, referred to as the sovereignty argument. The
Connecticut Supreme Court initially espoused the doctrine of govern-
ment as sovereign in the context of labor relations in Norwalk Teachers'
Association v. Board of Education.5 The Connecticut Supreme Court em-
I See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802
(1971). In Blount a public sector union sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating portions
of statutes which prohibited strikes against the federal government or the District of Columbia. The
Blount court concluded that no employee, whether public or private, had a constitutional right to
strike in concert with his fellow workers. The Blount court held that public employees possessed no
stronger right to strike than private employees and, in the absence of a statute, do not possess this
right. Judge Skelly Wright concurred in part with the majority's reasoning and in its result. How-
ever, Judge Wright asserted that the right to strike is related so intimately to the recognized funda-
mental right to organize that it merits some degree of constitutional protection.
2 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 408 (1985).
3 See Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 883; supra note 1.
4 Chief Justice Bird is no longer ChiefJustice of the California Supreme Court.
5 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951). The Norwalk Teachers' Association sued the Board of
Education seeking a declaratory judgment involving several questions including determining the
right of the plaintiff to organize itself as a labor union and whether the union could engage in strike
activities. The Norwalk court determined:
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phasized that sovereignty is embodied in the people and may only be
delegated to a government which they establish and operate by law. To
allow a public sector strike would deny governmental authority and
would contravene the public good.6
In Norwalk, the Connecticut Supreme Court cited several statements
made by Presidents who shared similar sentiments. 7 The most famous
statement was written by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to
the president of the National Federation of Federal Employees. Presi-
dent Roosevelt, a chief executive purportedly quite amicable to the inter-
ests of the union movement in the private sector in this country,
encapsulated the sovereignty argument when he concluded:
Militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of
government employees .... [A] strike of public employees manifests
nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the
operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such ac-
tion, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have
sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.8
The sovereignty doctrine remains the strongest and most persuasive
justification behind the common law prohibition of public sector strikes.
Further, although the sovereignty principal can be distinguished readily
from the others, threads of sovereignty are woven tightly through the
other three antistrike arguments, knitting a strong case in support of
prohibiting strikes by government employees. 9
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the people. They can delegate it to a
government which they create and operate by law. They can give to that government the
power and authority to perform certain duties and furnish certain services. The govern-
ment so created and empowered must employ people to carry out its task. Those people
are agents of the government. They exercise some part of the sovereignty entrusted to it.
They occupy a status entirely different from those who carry on a private enterprise. They
serve the public welfare and not a private purpose. To say that they can strike is the
equivalent of saying that they can deny the authority of government and contravene the
public welfare.
Id at 276, 83 A.2d at 485.
6 Id.
7 President Calvin Coolidge declared in response to the Boston police strike that "[t]here is no
right to strike against public safety by anybody." Id. at 273, 83 A.2d at 484. President Woodrow
Wilson, commenting on the same strike, stated that the public sector strike is "an intolerable crime
against civilization." In an address to Congress, President Wilson also stated:
The right of individuals to strike is inviolate and ought not be interfered with by any pro-
cess of government, but there is a predominant right and that is the right of the government
to protect all of its people and to assert its power and majesty against the challenge of any
class. The government, when it asserts that right, seeks not to antagonize a class but simply
to defend the right of the whole people as against the irreparable harm and injury that
might be done by the attempt by any class to usurp a power that only government itself has
a right to exercise as a right to all.
Id. at 273-74, 83 A.2d at 484.
8 Id.
9 The sovereignty argument, however, has not gone without challenge. In County Sanitation
Justice Broussard quoted Judge Harry T. Edwards who had earlier observed:
[T]he application of the strict sovereignty notion-that governmental power can never be
opposed by employee organizations-is clearly a vestige from another era, an era of unex-
panded government .... With the rapid growth of the government, both in sheer size as
well as in terms of assuming sources not traditionally associated with the 'sovereign,' gov-
ernment employees understandably no longer feel constrained by a notion that The King
can do no wrong.
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The second traditional justification barring public sector strikes rea-
sons that because the terms of public employment are established by the
legislature through unilateral lawmaking, public employers, the execu-
tive branch, cannot respond to strike pressure.10 Due to this division of
power, public sector strikes would result in government by contract and
not government by law.11
The third justification asserts that the legislature cannot grant public
employees the right to strike because this conferral would afford the
employees excessive bargaining power, distorting the political process. 12
Tangentially, some argue that such a legislative grant would be an im-
proper delegation of legislative authority. 13 The delegation which occurs
is not a direct delegation to a particular political unit; the decision mak-
ing process remains with the legislature. However, conferring a right to
strike upon the public sector indirectly delegates undue influence to pub-
lic sector employee unions, as well as a leverage device which would
improperly enable government employees to sway legislative determina-
tion. Although distinguishable from the first two common law principals,
this third justification is integrally related to the first two.
Lastly, the fourth common law justification holds that the public sec-
tor employee provides an essential service which would contravene the
common good if interrupted. 14 In an address to the Sixteenth Interna-
tional Convention of American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees (AFSCME) in April 1966, former Secretary of Labor Wirtz
asserted that "every governmental function is essential in the broadest
term. If it weren't, the government shouldn't be doing it."'15 Wirtz also
stated:
[A]n attempt to distinguish between various kinds of government
functions in terms of their essentiality seems to me fruitless and futile.
Policeman and fireman are ... no more essential than school teachers.
The only difference is that the costs and losses from being without fire
and police departments is more dramatic and more immediate, but...
in terms of measure of the importance to the future ... school chil-
dren being without education, even for a week, is a matter of serious
concern.'
6
38 Cal. 3d at 575, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431; infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
See also Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 Du. L. REv. 357, 359-60
(1972).
10 38 Cal. 3d at 576, 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 577, 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
13 Id. at 577-78, 699 P.2d at 844, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
14 Id. at 579, 699 P.2d at 845-49, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
15 Quoted in K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 111
(1967).
16 Id. at 113. Wirtz concluded:
I come to the conclusions that the sound doctrine of public employment relations is one
that assures and guarantees a reasonable and a fair procedure-with independent third
party determination if necessary-for settling new contract disputes, and which, therefore,
does not include the strike (and] there ought to be full protection.., by unions represent-
ing public employees in the handling of grievance issues, including, if necessary .... the
submission of such issues to independent arbitration, regardless of whether what we are
talking about is the application of an agreement or a statute.
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Wirtz's observations appear consistent with the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. United Mine Workers. 17 In
United Mine Workers, the Court held that the federal government's war-
time seizure of private coal mines converted these mines into an essen-
tial public service.' 8 Although the function of the mines remained the
same, the rights of the miners were altered because of the change of
ownership. The nature of the ownership, not the nature of the service,
was essential. 19 Consequently, the court approved the issuance of an in-
junction against striking workers, a remedy that would not have been
available had the mines remained privately owned.20 The United Mine
Workers Court implicitly equated government ownership of an industry
with its essentiality. However, as the role and function of the govern-
ment expands into areas in which the private sector competes, the "es-
sentiality" of that role could be attacked. 21
II. Applying the Common Law Justifications: County Sanitation District
(No. 2) v. Los Angeles County Employees Association
In County Sanitation, the California Supreme Court observed that the
right to strike implicates associational rights.22 Avoiding a constitutional
morass, however, the majority of the California court held that the four
traditional common law justifications prohibiting public sector strikes
should no longer be recognized in that state.23 Consequently, California
joined eleven other states that have allowed public sector strikes through
judicial opinion or statute.24 The County Sanitation court concluded that
17 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
18 Id. at 284-89.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 289-95. The Mine Workers Court focused solely upon the nature of the ownership of the
mines. The fact that the mines were under government control had significant bearing upon the
Court's determination.
21 See infra notes 35-36.
22 In County Sanitation the sanitation district employed approximately 500 individuals who were
represented by the Service Employees International Union. OnJuly 5, 1976, approximately 75% of
the district's employees went out on strike after negotiations between the union and the district for a
new wage and benefit agreement reached an impasse and failed to produce a new memorandum of
understanding. The district was granted a temporary restraining order but the strike continued for
11 days. After 11 days, the employees voted to accept a tentative agreement on a new memorandum
of understanding which was identical to the district's offer prior to the strike.
The district then commenced a tort action seeking damages. The Superior Court found the
strike to be unlawful and in violation of state public policy and awarded compensatory damages,
interest and costs. While specifically reserving the question of whether a right to strike deserves
constitutional protection, Justice Broussard concluded:
Although we are not inclined to hold that the right to strike rises to the magnitude of a
fundamental right, it does appear that associational rights are implicated to a substantial
degree. As such, the close connection between striking and other constitutionally protected
activity adds further weight to our rejection of the traditional common law rationales under-
lying the per se prohibition.
38 Cal. 3d at 591, 699 P.2d at 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
23 Id. at 586, 699 P.2d at 850, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
24 Twelve states have authorized expressly state and local public sector strikes by either statute
or judicial decision: Alaska, (statute); California, (judicial decision); Hawaii, (statute); Idaho, (stat-
ute); Illinois, (statute); Minnesota, (statute); Montana, (judicial decision); Oregon, (statute); Ohio,
(statute); Pennsylvania, (statute); Vermont, (statute); and Wisconsin, (statute). Strikes by public sec-
tor employees in 38 states and by employees of the United States remain illegal. 5 U.S.C. § 7311
(1982) provides in relevant part:
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strikes by public sector employees for the purpose of improving their
wages or condition of employment are not unlawful at common law un-
less or until it can be demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial
and imminent threat to public health or safety.25
A. The Sovereignty Argument
Addressing the sovereignty argument, Justice Broussard stated con-
cisely that the sovereignty argument "asserts that the government is the
embodiment of the people, and hence those entrusted to carry out its
function may not impede it."26 Some courts have construed a strike by
public employees to be a revolution or mutiny undermining the very
foundations of our democratic government. According to the court in
City of Cleveland v. Division 268,27 public sector strikes promote anarchy
and chaos. 28 In Board of Education v. Shanker,29 the court stated that pub-
lic sector strikes may even go so far as to render individual rights of no
avail.3 0
In rejecting the sovereignty principle, Justice Broussard and the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court majority relied upon an earlier California case
which abolished sovereign immunity from tort liability. In Muskopf v.
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the government of the United States or
the government of the District of Columbia if he-
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts thd right to strike, against against the government of
the United States or the government of the District of Columbia.
Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept
or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District
of Columbia if he-
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the government of the
United States or the government of the District of Columbia;
shall be fined not more that $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or
both.
25 38 Cal. 3d at 586, 699 P.2d at 850, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
26 38 Cal. 3d at 575, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431. See also Manchester v. Manchester
Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 510, 131 A.2d 59, 61 (1957) in which the New Hampshire Supreme
Court stated that "[I]ike the common law doctrine of the State's immunity from liability for any
negligence of the agents or servants while engaged in a governmental function... [t]he underlying
basis for the policy against strikes by public employees is the doctrine that governmental functions
may not be impeded."
27 41 Ohio Op. 236, 90 N.E.2d 711 (1949).
28 The court explicitly stated:
[I]t is clear that in our system of government, the government is a servant of all of the
people. And a strike against the public, a strike by public employees, has been denomi-
nated ... as a rebellion against government. The right to strike, if accorded to public
employees ... is one means of destroying government, and if they destroy government, we
have anarchy, we have chaos.
41 Ohio Op. at 239, 90 N.E.2d at 715.
29 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
30 In quoting Governor Dewey with approval,Justice Nunez commented: "Every liberty enjoyed
in this nation exists because it is protected by a government which functions uninterruptedly. The
paralysis of any portion of government could quickly lead to the paralysis of all society. Paralysis of
government is anarchy and in anarchy liberties become useless." Id at 944, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 552-53.
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Corning Hospital District3 1 the California Supreme Court concluded that
"[t]he rule of governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism, without
rational basis, and has existed only by the force of inertia." 32 Drawing an
analogy to Muskopf, the majority in County Sanitation reached a similar
conclusion, criticizing the sovereignty argument as a vague and outdated
theory based upon the assumption that the "King can do no wrong." 33
The court stated that "the use of this archaic concept to justify a per se
prohibition against public employee strikes is inconsistent with modem
social reality and should be hereafter laid to rest."'3 4
The court in County Sanitation argued that the sovereignty doctrine
does not comport with present socio-economic reality, 35 which is domi-
nated by large-scale business and governmental organizations. 36 Propo-
nents of this position further propose that the only effective way to
combat employer abuse, whether public or private, is to confer upon em-
ployees a constitutional right to strike.37
According to the California Supreme Court, the sheer size of gov-
ernment and its assumption of nontraditional services demanded that
public sector employees be treated equally to their private sector coun-
terparts.38 In light of the rights conferred upon the private sector, the
County Sanitation majority understood that government employees would
no longer feel constrained by the notion that the King could do no
wrong.3 9 Consequently, the California Supreme Court abandoned a con-
cept they considered archaic, and conferred a right to strike on public
sector employees.40
Both County Sanitation and Muskopf leave unclear whether govern-
ment employees no longer are constrained to adhere to the doctrine of
31 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (rejected the concept of sovereignty as a
justification for governmental immunity from tort liability).
32 Id at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
33 38 Cal. 3d at 575, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
34 Id. at 576, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
35 Id. at 575, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431. See also Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v.
School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969) (DeBruler, CJ., dissenting) wherein
the Chief Justice argued that many categories of employment, public and private, are substantially
indistinguishable. In concluding that the source of funding and management of services enterprises
is irrelevant in terms of "essentiality," Justice DeBruler concluded:
There is no difference in impact on the community between a strike by employees of a
public utility and employees of a private utility; nor between employees of a municipal bus
company and a privately owned bus company; nor between public school teachers and pa-
rochial school teachers. The form of ownership and management of the enterprise does
not determine the amount of disruption caused by a strike of the employees of that enter-
prise. In addition, the form of ownership that is actually employed is often a political and
historical accident, subject to future change by political forces. Services that were once
rendered by public enterprise may be contracted out to private enterprise, and then by
another administration returned to the public sector. It seems obvious to me that a strike
by some private employees would be far more disruptive of the society than [a strike by
certain public employees].
Id. at 569, 251 N.E.2d at 21 (paragraph headings omitted).
36 See Edwards, supra note 9, at 359-60.
37 See County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 593, 699 P.2d. at 855, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (Bird, CJ.,
concurring). See also Hanslowe & Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 1055 (1982).
38 38 Cal. 3d at 575, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
39 Id.
40 38 Cal. 3d at 576, 699 P.2d at 842, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
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governmental sovereignty, or whether an activist, result-oriented judici-
ary is undermining the common law.4 1 The elected legislature functions
principally to express the will of the sovereign through the democratic
process. The legislature takes the common law, molds it, shapes it, and
drafts and promulgates legislation pursuant to it. The legislature, not
the judiciary, speaks for the people. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in
Marbury v. Madison, the primary role of the judiciary is to say what the law
is, not to enact and promulgate the law.42 This embodies the very es-
sence of judicial duty.
Despite this country's early resistance to private sector unionism,
legislatures eventually enacted statutes securing the rights of organiza-
tion and collective bargaining, and the courts subsequently found these
legislative acts constitutional.4 3 Although similar protections initially
drafted by the executive and later ratified by Congress have been ex-
tended to public sector bargaining, these statutes exclude the right to
strike.44
In particular regard to the sovereignty argument, the County Sanita-
tion decision remains in the minority. The doctrine of sovereignty fails to
be undermined by a socio-economically dynamic society and an era of
expansive government growth into areas deemed nontraditional.45 Es-
sentially, the government must undertake any activity which its citizens
desire it to perform. The sovereignty doctrine focuses not upon the na-
ture of the service performed by the government, but upon the source of
governmental expansion-the general public. 46
41 Some cases, however, resist judicial activism in this area. See, e.g., Virgin Islands Port Auth. v.
S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, 494 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1974) (The court refused to confer the right to
strike on Port Authority employees by negative implication, concluding that "the Union and the
Authority could not by private agreement waive the illegality of such strikes and evade the express
legislative prohibition of strikes.")
42 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). Marbury involved the appointment of the "midnight" judges
by PresidentJohn Adams, and PresidentJefferson's subsequent disregard of those appointments on
a procedural issue. Mandamus was denied because the Supreme Court did not have original
jurisdiction.
43 In Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570
(1930), ChiefJustice Hughes stated:
We entertain no doubt of the constitutional authority of Congress to enact the [Railway
Labor Act of 1926].... The legality of collective action on the part of employees in order
to safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed. It has long been recognized that
employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances
and to promote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions at work.
Congress... could safeguard [this right of employees] and seek to make their appropriate
collective action an instrument of peace rather than strife.
See also NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) ("the right of employees to self
organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other
mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer," is a fundamental right); infra
notes 57 & 60.
44 The right of federal employees to bargain collectively was initially authorized in Executive
Order No. 10988 (1962). Executive Order No. 10988 was reissued and modified by Executive Order
No. 11491 (1969). In 1978, the provisions of Executive Order No. 11491 were, to a very significant
extent, codified in 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982) as Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978. The right to strike, however, has been expressly excluded by federal statute. See supra note 24.
45 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), discussed infra in notes
104-11.
46 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See also supra notes 17-21.
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Once the government engages in an activity, the fact that anyone,
including the judiciary, may consider these duties or services to be unor-
thodox or unnecessary becomes irrelevant. These functions and duties
emanate from the sovereign authority entrusted to the government.
Those hired become agents of the sovereign and perform a function dif-
ferent than those engaged in the private sector. Regardless of how ex-
pansive these functions and services become, a strike by public sector
employees constitutes an interference with the sovereign authority and
contravenes the public good. Consequently, in absence of a statute, pub-
lic sector strikes remain contrary to policy and precedent, as well as tradi-
tional notions of sovereignty.
Logically, it follows that if the right to strike is to be granted to pub-
lic employees it should be extended by the legislature, not the judiciary.
Congress and state legislatures are the proper fora in which changes in
the law should be effectuated. The judiciary must not sit as a
"superlegislature. ' '47 This opinion comports with those views expressed
in Justice Lucas' dissent in County Sanitation,48 and accords with prevail-
ing policy and precedent.
B. The Government by Contract Argument
In rejecting this justification, the California Supreme Court argued
that the original policy foundation for the rule was substantially under-
mined, if not obliterated, when the California legislature statutorily con-
ferred extensive bargaining rights upon public sector employees. This
unilateral conferral of authority to the executive branch enabled the gov-
ernment and unions to resolve most terms and conditions of employ-
ment through the collective bargaining process. 49 Advocates, including
the California Supreme Court, further assert that the common law prohi-
bition has been similarly undermined by state legislation granting public
sector employees the right to bargain collectively. 50 Proponents of this
position argue that the second justification also has been significantly
weakened by the passage of Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act.Si
Title VII confers upon federal employees the right to collectively bargain
and contemplates that matters relating to conditions of employment will
47 See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (sustaining a law requiring
employers to give their employees four hours off from work with full pay in order to vote).
48 38 Cal. 3d at 611, 699 P.2d at 867-68, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 456. Justice Lucas concluded that
"[tihe decision to allow public employee strikes requires a delicate and complex balancing process
best undertaken by the Legislature, which may formulate a comprehensive regulatory scheme
designed to avoid the disruption and chaos which invariably follow a cessation or interruption of
governmental services." See also Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 882 where the trial court recognized that
when the right of private employees to strike and to collectively bargain were first recognized and
were fully protected it was the result of congressional action. The court concluded that the plight of
the public sector employee paralleled that of the private sector and that in the absence of a statute,
government employees did not have the right to strike.
49 38 Cal. 3d at 576-77, 699 P.2d at 843, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431-33.
50 Id. See also El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Educ. Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 946, 963, 663
P.2d 893, 192 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1983) (Justice Grodin concurred with the majority noting that where
the right to collectively bargain has been statutorily conferred, the original policy reasons prohibit-
ing public strikes are significantly undermined.).
51 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982).
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be the subject of negotiation between the public sector employer and
employee.52
Although weakened, this second justification for barring public sec-
tor strikes does not lack merit. The fact that public employees may now
establish terms and conditions of employment through collective bar-
gaining rather than through unilateral lawmaking does not necessarily
undermine the policy prohibiting public sector strikes. As noted in El
Rancho Unified School District v. National Education Association,53 the legisla-
ture changed California's common law, not the judiciary. 54 Similarly, in
United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount,55 the court observed that Con-
gress acted unilaterally to confer upon federal government employees
the right to bargain collectively.56
Opinions such as County Sanitation are flawed logically. An act of the
legislature conferring upon public employees the right to bargain collec-
tively does not simultaneously undermine the common law prohibition
upon government strikes. Until the legislature delegates the right to
strike to public sector employees, the common law justifications prohibit-
ing government employee strikes remain intact. Although the legislature
intended that the right to bargain collectively be exercised effectively,
this effectiveness would not necessarily be implemented through a sup-
plemental right to strike.
The judiciary has recognized that the right to organize collectively
and to select representatives for the purposes of engaging in collective
bargaining constitutes a fundamental right.57 However, equating collec-
tive bargaining with the right to strike by implication would result in gov-
ernment by contract and not government by law. The ability to establish
terms and conditions of employment is conferred upon the executive by
a unilateral act of the legislature. The legislature confers the power to
engage in the bilateral bargaining process. The authority bestowed upon
the executive cannot be altered by a supplemental right to strike where
the legislature has not conferred such right unilaterally. Without having
express authority, the executive branch would be unable to respond to
strike pressure. If the executive branch responded to strike pressure and
altered the terms and conditions of employment without having received
legislative authority, such action would result in government by con-
tract.58 If government by contract is allowed, legislative imput into the
process is effectively eliminated. EvenJudge Wright, an advocate of con-
ferring the right to strike upon the public sector, notes, "I do not suggest
that the right to strike is co-equal with the right to form labor
organizations." 59
52 See supra note 44.
53 See supra note 50.
54 El Rancho, 33 Cal. 3d at 963, 663 P.2d at 893, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 13a.
55 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
56 Id. at 882.
57 See supra note 43 and infra note 60.
58 See City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36,46,
210 P.2d 305 (1949).
59 Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 885 (Wright, J., concurring). See also Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d
384 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Port Authority, supra note 41; Bennett v. Gravelle, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.
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In the absence of a statute expressly conferring that right, the judici-
ary would offend traditional notions of sovereignty by equating the right
to strike with the right to bargain collectively. Through the legislature,
the sovereign unilaterally conferred the right to collectively bargain. The
courts later ratified this right.60 By granting the right to bargain collec-
tively in both private and public sectors, the sovereign exercised its au-
thority, but did not erode the common law.
To remain consistent with the majority of cases and to comply with
traditional notions of constitutional adjudication, the decision to extend
the right to strike to public sector employees should rest with the legisla-
ture. Meanwhile, to equate collective bargaining with the right to strike
by implication would result in government by contract and not govern-
ment by law.
C. The Democratic Process Argument
In addressing the third justification, the County Sanitation court ini-
tially determined that all government services were not essential, that the
demand for certain services was elastic, and that the right to strike would
not particularly confer excessive bargaining power.6 1 The California
Supreme Court asserted that various economic restraints serve to temper
the potential bargaining power of striking government employees and
thus enable public officials to resist excessive demands. 62 Others have
asserted that public sentiment against a strike will often restrict potential
political pressure exercised by the public sector unions, and reduce the
strike's effectiveness. 63 Advocates of this proposal maintain that this
check upon potential political distortion may only be achieved by grant-
ing a limited right to strike.64 In essence, proponents view a carefully
defined right to strike as a safety valve which will in fact prevent strikes,
1971), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972); Johnson v. City of Albany, 413 F. Supp. 782, 797 (M.D.
Ga. 1976); Police Officers' Guild v. Washington, 369 F. Supp. 543 (D.D.C. 1973); Melton v. City of
Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C.
1969). Cf. International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), infra
note 127.
60 See supra notes 43 & 57. The right to organize collectively and to select representatives for the
purpose of engaging in collective bargaining has long been recognized as a fundamental right. See
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1936).
61 38 Cal. 3d at 577-79, 699 P.2d at 843-44, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432-34.
62 38 Cal. 3d at 578-79, 699 P.2d at 844, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34. See also Burton & Krider, The
Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 425 (1970). Burton and Krider
maintain:
First, wages lost due to strikes are as important to public employees as they are to employ-
ees in the private sector. Second, the public's concern over increasing tax rates may pre-
vent the decision making process from being dominated by political instead of economic
considerations .... A third and related economic constraint arises from such services as
water, sewage and in some instances, sanitation, where explicit prices are charged. Even if
representatives of groups other than employees and the employer do not enter the bargain-
ing process, both union and local government are aware of the economic implications of
bargaining which leads to higher prices which are clearly visible to the public. A fourth
economic constraint on employees exists in those services where subcontracting to the pri-
vate sector is a realistic alternative.
63 See infra notes 64-67.
64 See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, reprinted in 251 GovT. EMPLOY. REL. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-3 (1968).
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and believe that a blanket prohibition would be construed as unfair. A
limited right to strike would be construed by the public as just, but only
up to the limits imposed by the legislature. Strikes beyond these bound-
aries would be intolerable and would lack public support.65
For instance, the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission believes that
the collective bargaining process would be strengthened by a carefully
defined and qualified right to strike.66 A limited right to strike would
curb potential employer monopsony while at the same time serve notice
on the employee that limits exist in regard to the hardships which may be
imposed upon the public.67 In short, this position maintains that a public
sector strike will be effective so long as the public supports it.
Pursuant to these recommendations, the Pennsylvania Legislature
enacted a statute which prohibits "[s]trikes by guards at prisons or
mental hospitals, or employees directly involved with the necessary func-
tioning of the courts .... ,,6  The legislature further excluded from the
statutory definition of "public employee," "elected officials, appointees
of the Governor .... management level employees . . . , confidential
employees, clergymen .... [and] policemen and firemen." 69 Having
carefully defined and qualified the right to strike among public sector
employees, the Pennsylvania Legislature permitted strikes by the remain-
ing public employees "unless or until such a strike creates a clear and
present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public." 70
Other states have followed Pennsylvania's lead and passed similar
legislation. 71
To the contrary, the Taylor Committee of New York72 determined
that only the right to strike in the private sector reflects an economic
quality that may be effectively limited by market constraints, while in the
public sector the costs are economic only in a very narrow sense and are
on the whole political.7 3 Although it may accord with principles of sover-
eignty, a legislative conferral of a right to strike may remain economically
imprudent.
Professors Wellington and Winter argue that the combination of the
right to strike and the usual methods of political pressure may afford
public sector unions a disproportionate share of the effective powers in
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. The Pennsylvania Governor's Commission concluded:
The collective bargaining process will be strengthened if the qualified right to strike is rec-
ognized. It will be some curb on the possible intrasigence of an employer;, and the limita-
tions on the right to strike will serve notice on the employee that there are limits to the
hardships that he can impose.
Id.
68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Purdon 1970).
69 Id. § 1101.301(2).
70 Id. § 1101.1003.
71 See, e.g., Hawaii Public Employment Relations Act, HAwAn REV. STAT. §§ 89-1 to 89-20
(1982); and Illinois Public Labor Relations Act; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601 to 1625 (Smith-
Hurd 1983).
72 NEW YORK GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FiNAL REPORT (1966).
73 Id at 8-11. See also Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
78 YALE .J. 1107, 1117 (1969).
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the political decision process.74 The combination of the two devices
would enable collective bargaining to skew the results of the normal
American political process. 75 Wellington and Winter advance three fac-
tors embodied in the democratic process which undermine the potential
for employer monopsony. First, public employers are less likely to ex-
ploit their workers because they must pay wages competitive with private
sector wages. 76 Secondly, a number of substitutable and competing pri-
vate and public employers often exist in the labor market. 77 Lastly, even
if public employees may on occasion have monopsony power, economic
criteria only partially determines government policy and no assurance
can be found that the power will be exploited since the profit motive
does not prevail as in the private sector.78
In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the cost incurred by the general
public by conferring a right to strike upon public employees far out-
weighs any benefits which employees could accrue. Because the govern-
ment provides essential services, uncompromising demands, and
relatively few alternatives, excessive wage demands will skew the political
process by forcing either an increase in taxes or possible resource alloca-
tion from necessary government services. 79 No natural balancing device
exists in the public sector comparable to that found in the private sector.
In theory, in the private sector potential employment reduction checks
excessive wage demands.80 No such threat exists in the public sector.
Our system of government is based upon enumerated powers, in-
cluding the power to tax. Because our progressive tax structure affects
each segment of the populace differently and because the government
has limited ability to impose certain taxes, a public sector strike would
compel the government to redistribute income rather than allocate
resources.
81
Under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, indi-
viduals are guaranteed certain fundamental rights, including the right of
association and free speech.82 The right to collectively organize, to se-
lect representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining, emanates
from these rights.8 3 The Constitution protects these rights from govern-
ment infringement. Although these rights may be exercised, they must
not be exercised in a manner which would result in increasing tax rates
or in a reallocation of resources. Because the right to strike can poten-
tially lead to redistribution of income,8 4 public sector employees effec-
tively would be sharing in the determination of political issues.85
74 Id. at 1123-27.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1116-23.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1119-23.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1122-23.
82 See infra note 115.
83 See supra note 60.
84 Wellington & Winter, supra note 73, at 1122-23.
85 See Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes Democracy, 1980 GOV'T.
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Collective bargaining represents an economic activity protected
under a constitutional umbrella. Yet, this umbrella is pierced if public
sector employees are entitled unduly to affect essentially political ques-
tions.8 6 As citizens, public sector employees may influence political deci-
sions through lobbying, petitioning and even block voting. If the right to
strike is conferred upon public sector employees, however, they may fur-
ther influence political determinations by wielding a supplemental lever-
age device not available to the general public.
Further, the sovereignty and the democratic process justifications
appear to overlap. The right to strike, even when conferred by statute,
may be an improper delegation of legislative authority contrary to princi-
ples of sovereignty and the common good. Although the legislative deci-
sion to authorize public sector strikes does not violate the doctrine of
sovereignty, a violation may occur if the bargaining unit employs the
strike as a leverage device.
A right granted by the sovereign nonetheless can be abused. When
a strike is used to force the government to reallocate resources or to raise
taxes, the political implications exceed the narrow scope of the right as
conferred initially by the sovereign. The union and the legislature argua-
bly act as coequals in this situation. At this point, the strike no longer
promotes the common good but directly contravenes it. When the effect
of the strike exceeds the scope of the right, an invalid exercise of legisla-
tive authority occurs. Although the legislature retains ultimate control of
the political decision making process, the determination reached directly
results from undue influence. Consequently, the public sector bargain-
ing unit would possess a disproportionate share of the powers of political
decision. This disserves principles of democratic self-governance and ar-
guably skews the political process.
If granting the public employees the right to strike will skew the
political process, violate principles of sovereignty, and allow the collec-
tive bargaining unit a disproportionate share of the political process, the
legislature should resist the attempt by a minority to confer such rights so
long as it can be demonstrated that government strikes contravene the
common good. If the legislature were to allow public sector employees
additional influence (besides the traditional right to vote and to lobby)
and skew the political process through the exercise of the right to strike,
it would delegate legislative authority improperly.8 7
UNION REV. 5-6 (arguing that both the right to strike and all compulsory public sector bargaining are
inconsistent with democratic political philosophy).
86 See Johnson v. City of Albany, 413 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ga. 1976), supra note 59.
87 The court in Blount appropriately summarized the third common law objection to public sec-
tor strikes when it concluded:
In the private sphere, the strike is used to equalize bargaining power, but this has univer-
sally been held not to be appropriate when its object and purpose can only be to influence
the essentially political decisions of Government in the allocation of its resources. Con-
gress has an obligation to ensure that the machinery of the Federal government continues
to function at all times without interference. Prohibition of strikes by its employees is a
reasonable implementation of that obligation.
325 F. Supp. at 884.
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D. The Essential Services Argument
As noted in County Sanitation, the assumption that all government
services are essential underlies the fourth principle barring public sector
strikes.88 Justice Broussard claims that this assumption is unsupportable
in light of modern socio-economic reality.89 Likewise, Hanslowe and
Acierno declared that our complex contemporary industrial state makes
it unrealistic to assert that all public services are essential. 90 They ob-
serve that "[p]ublic services vary as to essentiality; many privately-oper-
ated services are more essential than public ones. In many categories of
employment, among the largest of which is education, public and private
activity substantially overlap."91
In questioning the essential nature of some government functions,
both the County Sanitation court92 and Hanslowe and Acierno 93 place
great reliance upon United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
Co. 94 They argue that this recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court reflects a shift in the common law perspective regarding the essen-
tiality of some government services.
In Transportation Union the Supreme Court held that employees of a
private railroad which had been acquired by a governmental entity re-
tained their limited right to strike which had previously been conferred
upon them under the Railway Labor Act.95 The Court determined that
the change of ownership did not alter the character of the service pro-
vided by the railroad, and the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution 96 required continued application of federal labor law to the
socialized enterprise. 97 This led Justice Broussard to conclude in County
88 38 Cal. 3d at 579-86, 699 P.2d at 845-50, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434-39.
89 Id. Although tangential, Judge Broussard, while attempting to undermine the third rationale
prohibiting public sector strikes, observed that:
Modern governments engage in an enormous number and variety of functions, which
clearly vary as to their degree of essentiality. As such, the absence of an unavoidable nexus
between most public services and essentiality necessarily undercuts the notion that public
officials will be forced to settle strikes quickly and at all costs.
Id. at 577-78, 699 P.2d at 844, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 432-34. See also supra note 34.
90 Hanslowe & Acierno, supra note 37, at 1068. Advocates of this point frequently cite PATCO
v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982), to demonstrate that the govern-
ment can negate the impact of a public sector strike and hold firm against union demands even in the
face of substantial inconvenience.
91 See supra note 35 (Justice DeBruler reaches a similar conclusion).
92 38 Cal. 3d at 580-81, 699 P.2d at 845-46, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434-36.
93 Hanslowe & Acierno, supra note 37, at 1070-71.
94 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
95 Id. at 684-90.
96 U.S. CONST. art. VI. The supremacy clause provides in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof- and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
97 455 U.S. at 687. The Supreme Court observed:
Just as the Federal Government cannot usurp traditional state functions, there is no justifi-
cation for a rule which would allow the States, by acquiring functions previously performed
by the private sector, to erode federal authority in area traditionally subject to federal statu-
tory regulation.
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Sanitation that the Transportation Union decision departed from the United
States Supreme Court's earlier decision in United Mine Workers.98 Justice
Broussard read Transportation Union to conclude that the nature of the
service provided determines its essentiality and the impact of its disrup-
tion on the public welfare. 99 Justice Broussard believed that the gui-
dance of Transportation Union was superior to the simplistic determination
provided by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers that a service be-
comes essential once it comes under government control.' 00 This led
Justice Broussard to conclude that strikes by private workers often pose a
more serious threat to the public interest than would many of those
which involve public employees. 10 1
Those who argue that the essentiality argument has lost its merit in
light of Transportation Union ignore the limited precedential value of
Transportation Union. Because it is founded upon the supremacy clause of
the Constitution, 10 2 Transportation Union bears uncertain impact upon the
development of a common law right to strike in the public sector. Fur-
thermore, the Transportation Union Court relied principally upon National
League of Cities v. Usery,' 0 3 which was subsequently overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.' 0 4 Although National League had
98 38 Cal. 3d at 580, 699 P.2d at 845-46, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Justice Broussard admits to this flaw. 38 Cal. 3d at 580, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at
434-35.
103 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In 1974 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act in order to
extend the Act's minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to almost all employees of states
and their political subdivisions. A number of cities and states brought suit against the Secretary of
Labor, challenging the validity of the 1974 amendments and seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. The lower federal court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
might be granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The National League Court observed
that, insofar as the 1974 amendments operate directly to displace the states' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships in areas of "traditional" governmental functions, they are not
within the authority granted Congress under the commerce clause. By enacting the 1974 amend-
ments, Congress sought to wield its commerce power in a fashion that would impair the states'
ability to function effectively in a federal system and did not comport with the federal system of
government as envisioned in the Constitution. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress may
not exercise its power to regulate commerce to impose upon the states its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral government functions are to be made.
104 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia the Transit Authority brought an action seeking a declaratory
judgment, stating that it was entitled to tenth amendment immunity from minimum wage and over-
time pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Transit Authority had received substantial
federal financial assistance under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. In 1979, the Wage
and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion in light of National League
that the Transit Authority's operations were not immune from the minimum wage and overtime
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Transit Authority filed an action in federal dis-
trict court seeking declaratory relief. The District Court found in favor of the Transit Authority and
held that municipal ownership and operation of a mass transit system is a traditional governmental
function and under National League is exempt from the requirements imposed upon them by Con-
gress. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded and determined that, in affording the Transit
Authority's employees the protection of the wage and hour provisions, Congress contravened no
affirmative limit on its power under the commerce clause. The Supreme Court initially determined
that the National League standard, determining the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms
of traditional government functions, was unworkable and inconsistent with established principles of
federalism. These provisions were not destructive of state sovereignty and did not violate any con-
stitutional provisions. Justice Blackman believed that the states' continued role in the federal system
is primarily guaranteed not by any externally imposed limits on the commerce power, but by the
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provided some examples of "traditional governmental functions," the
National League Court failed to provide an adequate general explanation
of how to distinguish a "traditional" function from a "nontraditional"
one. Consequently, state and federal courts were not able to identify a
"traditional" function for purposes of state immunity under the com-
merce clause.
The Garcia holding echoes Former Secretary of Labor Wirtz's com-
ments' 0 5 and the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers 106 by
giving a broad reading to the essentiality of governmental functions.' 0 7
The difficulty in determining which governmental functions are essential
mirrors the difficulty the courts faced prior to Garcia in assessing which
governmental functions were traditional. Like Transportation Union, the
Garcia case, because it is founded upon the tenth amendment of the Con-
stitution, 08 may hold dubious precedential value. However, it may indi-
cate that the Court is taking a more expansive view of government
functions. The Court observed:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority
left open to them under the constitution, the States must be equally
free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common
weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-includ-
ing the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any rule of state
immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary"
nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected fed-
eraljudiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and
which ones it dislikes.' 0 9
The Garcia Court appears to have focused upon the policy underly-
ing the governmental decision to engage in the activity in question, and
not the nature of the service provided. If no clear test exists to deter-
mine what constitutes a "traditional" function of government, it is less
possible to distinguish an "essential" government function from one that
is "nonessential." ' 10 Moreover, the role of the judiciary does not include
checking the will of the sovereign. If the sovereign, through its elected
structure of the federal government itself. In this case, Justice Blackman believed the political pro-
cess effectively protected that role. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the Transit
Aauthority was not immune from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Act.
105 See supra notes 15-16.
106 330 U.S. 258 (1947); see supra notes 17-20.
107 See supra notes 15-16.
108 U.S. CONsT. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
109 469 U.S. at 546. The Garda court concluded:
"The science of government... is the science of experiment" .. and the States cannot
serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment .. .if they must pay an added
price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an
earlier day and a different society left in private hands.
Id. (citations omitted).
110 See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring):
There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between essential
and non-essential governmental functions. Many governmental functions of today have at
some time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our government provides
that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the people-acting not through the courts
but through their elected legislative representatives-have the power to determine as con-
ditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires.
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representatives, decides to undertake an activity, regardless of how frivo-
lous or unorthodox, it should be entitled to do so within constitutional
limits. To allow the judiciary to determine which governmental functions
it considers integral, necessary, or essential would stand contrary to prin-
ciples of democratic self-governance and breed inconsistency.111
An argument emerges from Garcia by analogy. Because it is virtually
impossible to determine the essentiality of government services, tradi-
tional notions of democracy would not allow the judiciary to carve out
exceptions in the common law prohibition on public sector strikes based
upon an amorphous concept of "essentiality." To allow such strikes
through judicial activism would constitute a threat to the public welfare
and conflict with principles of sovereignty.
The common law prohibitions upon public sector strikes apparently
remain intact. The expansion and diversity of governmental activity, as
well as socio-economic changes, have not eroded the common law. Con-
sequently, in the absence of a statute, it remains contrary to the common
law to permit public sector employees to inhibit or interfere with essen-
tial government functions. Some, however, including Judge Wright and
Chief Justice Bird of California, argue that the right to strike emanates
from a higher law than the common law-the United States Constitution.
III. Constitutional Considerations
Except for the minority views of ChiefJustice Bird, in her concurring
opinion in County Sanitation,1 12 and the concurring opinion of Judge
Wright in Blount,' 3 it has been well settled that no constitutional right to
strike exists. 14 However, the judiciary appears increasingly concerned
that a right to strike for the public sector may emanate from enumerated
constitutional rights. Until County Sanitation, a public sector employee
who engaged in a strike against the government found no safe harbor in
constitutional waters. Because the constitutional arguments in the opin-
ions of Judge Wright and Chief Justice Bird are found in dicta, and be-
cause the right to strike is not enumerated in the Constitution, their
views raise questions regarding precedential value as well.
Judge Wright bases his opinion solely upon emanations from
enumurated first amendment rights-the rights of free speech and asso-
ciation." 5 He asserts that the right to strike may be a fundamental right
which warrants elevated constitutional protection. 116 He also observes
that the right to form labor organizations has been recognized as a fun-
damental right emanating from the first amendment."17 Judge Wright
concludes that the right to strike is "intimately related" to the right to
111 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
112 38 Cal. 3d at 593, 699 P.2d at 855, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444; see supra note 2.
113 325 F. Supp. at 885; see supra note 1.
114 See supra note 1.
115 U.S. CONST. amend. I, in relevant part, provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
116 325 F. Supp. at 885.
117 Id.
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form labor organizations and deserves some level of constitutional
protection. 118
Basing constitutional adjudication upon principles of intimacy repre-
sents a novel approach indeed. If an intimacy test were applied, courts
would encounter difficulty determining which activities merited constitu-
tional protection. A test based upon intimacy resembles a test assessing
essentiality. Both standards are unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice. Any such rule leads to inconsistent results and at the same time
disserves traditional notions of constitutional interpretation. It breeds
inconsistency because it has lost sight of these principles.
According to ChiefJustice Bird, the right to strike not only emanates
from protected first amendment rights, but also can be derived from pro-
tected rights in the fifth, I I 9thirteenth, 120 and fourteenth amendments. 121
She believes that a constitutional right to strike rests on a number of
"bedrock principles" found in both the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of California. 22 Initially, she contends that
the right to strike emanates from the basic personal liberty to pursue
happiness and economic security through productive labor.123 Secondly,
she asserts the prohibition of public sector strikes contradicts the thir-
teenth amendment's ban upon involuntary servitude. 124 She concludes
that the fundamental freedoms of association and expression support a
fundamental right to strike. 125
Regardless of the views of Judge Wright and Chief Justice Bird,
neither public sector nor private sector employees enjoy an enumerated
constitutional right to strike. Although the right of association, including
the right to organize collectively, is well recognized and protected, 26 the
right to strike has never been granted such elevated status. In fact, the
Supreme Court expressed the prevailing view in International Union v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board:127
118 Id.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V, as relevant, provides: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ......
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII states:
(1) Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
(2) Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV in relevant part provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
122 38 Cal. 3d at 594, 699 P.2d at 855-56, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
123 Id. at 594-97, 699 P.2d at 856-58, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444-47.
124 Id. at 597-600, 699 P.2d at 858-60, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 446-69.
125 Id. at 600-604, 699 P.2d at 860-62, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 448-52.
126 See Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 883. See also supra note 60.
127 336 U.S. 245 (1949). In Wisconsin Employment, the collective bargaining agent called meetings
during work hours in order to interfere with production and force the employer to resolve the nego-
tiation impasse. The Court held that it was within the power of the State to prohibit the particular
course of conduct proscribed.
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[T]he right to strike, because of its more serious impact upon the pub-
lic interest, is more vulnerable to regulation than the right to organize
and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bargaining
which this Court has characterized as a "fundamental right" and
which, as the Court has pointed out, was recognized as such in its deci-
sions long before it was given protection by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 12 8
This decision led the majority in Blount to conclude that, in the ab-
sence of any enumerated constitutional right to strike, the federal gov-
ernment may condition employment upon a promise not to withhold
labor collectively. 129 The federal government may also bar public sector
strikes, whether because of prerogatives of the sovereign, some sense of
higher obligation associated with public service, to protect the function-
ing of the government without interruption, to protect public health and
safety, or for some other justifiable reason.'3 0
Until recently, the right to strike was not entitled to constitutional
protection. However, both the opinion of the majority and the concur-
ring opinion of Chief Justice Bird in County Sanitation amplified the con-
stitutional concerns first expressed by Judge Wright in Blount. These
opinions raise the issue of whether the right to strike solidly rests upon a
bedrock of constitutional principles.
A. The First Amendment
Public employees enjoy no fewer rights and privileges than other cit-
izens; all citizens of the United States share constitutional rights
equally.' 3 ' Those rights include the first amendment rights of free
speech and association.' 3 2 The right of association may be exercised cor-
relatively with the right of free speech in order to advance beliefs and
ideas. 13
Because public employees hold a fundamental right of free speech
and association, they cannot be prohibited from exercising these rights
through union activities. 134 For example, in Lontini v. VanCleave, 13 5 which
involved a policeman discharged because of union membership, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the officer had a constitutional right under
the first amendment to join a labor union and could not be suspended or
dismissed from his employment in the absence of a compelling state in-
terest.' 36 Likewise, a public sector employee may not be sanctioned for
exercising his constitutional rights by advocating that public employees
have a right to strike or that government employees may join unions
128 Id. at 259. See also Bloint, 325 F.Supp. at 883.
129 325 F. Supp. at 883.
130 Id.
131 The fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause insures that all citizens of the
United States share federal constitutional rights equally. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; supra note 121.
132 See supra note 115.
133 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
134 See Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga 1971),supra note 59; Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969), supra note 59.
135 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973).
136 Id. at 967.
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which advance a similar position. 137 A constitutional line is drawn, how-
ever, at the point of advocacy, a line which public sector employees are
not entitled to cross.13 8 While public sector employees are free to associ-
ate and advocate, a public sector employee may not strike in order to
compel the government to recognize or bargain with a union. 3 9
As noted in United Steelworkers of America v. University of Alabama,140
however, if an employee can demonstrate that the motive for his or her
termination or suspension was curtailment of, or punishment for, the ex-
ercise of employee's rights, judicial relief would be appropriate.' 4 '
When employees go further than organization and advocacy to engage in
a strike attempting to compel their public employer to recognize or bar-
gain with a union, they have pierced the umbrella of constitutionally pro-
tected free speech and association. The government may discharge or
otherwise penalize striking employees.' 42
No enumerated right to strike exists in the first amendment when
read literally.' 43 Nor does such right exist at common law-neither to-
day nor when the first amendment was drafted in 1791. Consequently, in
the absence of a statute conferring a right to strike, a public sector em-
ployee will not be protected under either the first amendment or at com-
mon law for engaging in an illegal activity.
Further, when the judiciary implies a right to strike, it engages in
judicial activism contrary to the great weight of authority. 14 4 As the court
137 See, e.g., Aurora Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1973).
138 See Johnson v. City of Albany, 413 F. Supp. 782, 797 (M.D. Ga. 1976) ("While they may so
associate and advocate and not be retaliated against for doing so, they cannot go further and by
concert of action-by striking-compel their public employer to recognize or bargain with a
union.").
139 Id.
140 599 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1979). The United Steelworkers decision was an action brought by termi-
nated union members by their union and others seeking injunctive relief, damages, declaratory re-
lief, and other appropriate relief under the Civil Rights Act against university officials for violations
of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.
141 Id. at 61. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry involved a first and fifth
amendment challenge to the dismissal of the respondent who was employed in a state college system
for ten years. Although the college dismissed the respondent with no explanation or hearing, the
Court found no constitutional violation.
142 See Johnson, 413 F. Supp. at 797; cases cited supra note 59. See also Jefferson County Teachers
Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971). In Jefferson
County the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a permanent injunction prohibiting teachers and
their union representatives from participating in a strike in county public schools. The court
observed:
It is further contended the injunction violates appellant's constitutional rights of free
speech and public assembly. Such rights are not absolute but are limited by the counter-
vailing rights of others. The injunction enjoins appellants from 'participating in a con-
certed work stoppage or strike by the teachers in the public schools ofJefferson County.' It
prohibits the commission of illegal acts, and the rights of free speech and public assembly
do not license violation of law.
463 S.W.2d at 630.
143 See supra note 115.
144 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n of Teachers, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965);
Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n., 463 S.W.2d 627; School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314,
157 N.W.2d 206 (1968); Rogoffv. Anderson, 34 App. Div. 2d 154, 310 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1970); State v.
Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1970); Abbott v. Meyers, 20 Ohio App. 2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869 (1969);
City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958); City of Wauwa-
tosa v. King, 49 Wisc. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).
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appropriately concluded in Blount: "It should be pointed out that the fact
that public employees may not strike does not interfere with their rights
which are fundamentally and constitutionally protected. The right to or-
ganize collectively and to select representatives for the purpose of engag-
ing in collective bargaining is such a fundamental right." 145 The right to
strike, however, does not warrant such protection.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment
In addition to first amendment theories, prohibitions upon public
employee strikes have been challenged on other constitutional grounds.
Despite the advocacy of Chief Justice Bird and Judge Wright, to date
nearly all courts reviewing this issue have held that the prohibition of
public sector strikes does not violate the United States Constitution, re-
gardless of the grounds under which the ban is challenged. 146
In County Sanitation Chief Justice Bird argues that a denial of the
right to strike violates an absolute prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude under the thirteenth amendment. 147 Her argument rests upon the
assumption that a court can no longer expect an employee to quit his job
if the terms or conditions of employment are unacceptable. 148 She ar-
gues that the group right to strike has replaced the individual right to
change employers. 149
Chief Justice Bird's assumption lacks foundation and her opinion
contravenes the great weight of prevailing precedent. 150 An individual in
this country can never be forced to work. Further, even if public sector
employees are enjoined from striking, they are not compelled to work.
Public employees, just as employees in the private sector, may leave their
employment at any time, particularly if the terms and conditions of em-
ployment are unacceptable. InJefferson County Teachers Association v. Board
of Education '5' the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in rejecting appellant's
claim that the denial of the right to strike violated the thirteenth amend-
ment, concluded: "An injunction of the kind before us does not compel
performance of personal service against the will of the employee because
he can terminate his contract if he so desires."' 5 2
An absolute prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude
does exist under the thirteenth amendment. However, absent evidence
of the actual compulsion of personal services, any constitutional argu-
145 325 F. Supp. at 883.
146 See supra note 144 & infra notes 150, 153 & 173.
147 38 Cal. 3d at 597-600, 699 P.2d at 858-60, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 446-49.
148 Id. at 598-99, 699 P.2d at 858-59, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48.
149 Id. at 599, 699 P.2d at 859, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
150 See, e.g., City of Evanston v. Buick, 421 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1970); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 2 F.2d 993, 994-995 (1924), aff'd, 6 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1925);
Los Angeles Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305; Pinellas County Class-
room Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1968); Holland Educ. Ass'n.,
380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206; Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Floor Decorators'
Union, 229 Minn. 87, 39 N.W.2d 183 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 906 (1950); In re Block, 50
NJ. 494, 236 A.2d 592 (1967).
151 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971), supra note 142.
152 463 S.W.2d at 630.
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ment against the prohibition of public sector strikes based upon the thir-
teenth amendment lacks merit.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
Courts have rebuffed, with equal facility, fourteenth amendment
equal protection challenges to the prohibitions against public sector
strikes.- 53 As Justice Brandeis observed for the Supreme Court in Dorchy
v. Kansas, 154 "[n]either the common law nor the Fourteenth Amendment
confer the absolute right to strike."' 155 The weight of judicial opinion
over the past sixty years has been consistent with this conclusion.' 56
ChiefJustice Bird argues, however, that the basic personal liberty to
pursue happiness and economic security through productive labor rises
to the level of a constitutionally protected right under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.' 57 She candidly admits, however, that the right to
strike has never been included as a liberty interest protected by the Con-
stitution. 158 The right to strike, the chief justice contends, should be a
constitutionally protected liberty interest arising out of considerations of
fairness and the inherent nature of work. 159
Although the right to strike may arise out of concepts of fairness and
the inherent nature of work, the right does not appear among those enu-
merated and protected in the United States Constitution. The judiciary
does not function to write social policy by promulgating changes in the
law based on concepts of fairness or the inherent nature of work. That
task remains with the legislature. Only after the sovereign has acted can
concepts such as these be implicated in constitutional adjudication.
ChiefJustice Bird's attempt to equate a worker's interest in the con-
ditions and terms of his employment with a constitutionally protected
property interest' 60 is similarly unpersuasive, and judicially unsubstanti-
ated. In Peny v. Sindermann 161 the Supreme Court stated that, in order to
find a cognizable and constitutionally protected property right under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, precise rules or explicit understand-
ings must exist to support a claim of entitlement to a benefit.' 62 This
type of property interest does not exist in an amorphous interest in terms
153 See, e.g.,Jefferson County, 463 S.W.2d 627, supra notes 142 & 151; Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich.
314, 157 N.W.2d 206, supra note 150; City of Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 332
Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952); Head v. Special School Dist. (No. 1), 288 Minn. 496, 182 N.W.2d
887 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1970); City of N.Y. v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128
(1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969); Abbott v. Myers, 20 Ohio App. 2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869
(1969).
154 272 U.S. 306 (1926). Dorchy involved a violation of § 19 of the Court of Industrial Relations
Act which prohibited an officer of a labor union from inducing others to hinder, delay, limit or
suspend the operations of mining. The Supreme Court held that this Act did not constitute a denial
of the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
155 Id. at 311.
156 See supra note 153.
157 County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 594-98, 699 P.2d at 856-58, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444-48.
158 Id. at 596, 699 P.2d at 857, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
159 Id. at 596-97, 699 P.2d at 857, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
160 Id. at 597-98, 699 P.2d at 858, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 446-48.
161 408 U.S. 593 (1972), supra note 141.
162 408 U.S. at 601. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. University of Alabama, 599 F.2d 56, 60
(5th Cir. 1979) ("A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if
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and conditions of employment, since the terms and conditions of em-
ployment can change frequently. Further, it is extremely difficult to
demonstrate that a public sector employee has a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement in this interest, when the interest cannot clearly be defined.
Where no ascertainable or manageable standard exists, inconsistency in-
ures. Inconsistency contravenes existing principles of constitutional ad-
judication. Consequently, arguments of this nature lack merit.
Some argue that because the fourteenth amendment protects
against statutory discrimination, public sector employees should share
the same right to strike as their private sector counterparts. As the trial
court noted in Blount, 163 in the absence of a fundamental right, the gov-
ernment does not act irrationally or arbitrarily to condition employment
upon a promise not to strike.16 The Supreme Court declared in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland 16 5 that the constitutional safeguard of equal protec-
tion is transgressed only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's purpose.1 66 Courts presume
an act of the legislature to have been exercised within the power consti-
tutionally conferred upon the legislature, despite the fact that in applica-
tion some laws may result in some inequality. The courts will not set
aside statutory discrimination if any statement of facts can be construed
to support it.167
Since no worker possesses a fundamental right to strike, McGowan
applies. Where no statute exists and the common law applies, the gov-
ernment, as employer of the public sector, may constitutionally condition
public sector employment on a promise not to strike. To uphold a statu-
tory prohibition upon public sector strikes requires only a rational basis
and a statute that does not discriminate arbitrarily. 68 For example, in
Abbott v. Myers 169 the Ferguson Act, which specifically provided "[n]o
public employee shall strike," was found valid under the equal protection
clause. i70 The abundance of case law on point led the Jefferson County 171
court to conclude matter of factly that "there is a reasonable basis for
distinguishing between private and the public employees, particularly in
this area. Therefore, to treat them differently is not a denial of equal
protection in the constitutional sense."17 2
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the
benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.").
163 See supra note 1.
164 325 F. Supp. at 883.
165 366 U.S. 420 (1961). McGowan involved a violation of a statute which generally prohibited
sales of merchandise on Sunday. The Court found that this statute did not violate the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at 425-26.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See cases cited supra, note 153.
169 20 Ohio App. 2d 65,251 N.E.2d 869 (1969). Abbott involved a strike by employees of a county
home and hospital. The County Board of Commissioners determined that this strike was prohibited
by statute. Consequently, the employees were dismissed. The dismissals were upheld and the court
determined that no violation of the Constitution occurred.
170 251 N.E.2d at 876. See also Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. and Hosp. and Institu-
tional Employees Union, 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954).
171 Jefferson County, 463 S.W.2d 627.
172 Id. at 630.
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In light of such precedent, the fourteenth amendment will not pro-
tect those challenging the ban against public sector strikes. Unlike a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest, a public sector employee has no
recognized vested property right in his interest in conditions and terms
of employment. Consequently, as Justice Brandeis concluded over sixty
years ago,173 in the absence of a statute conferring such a right upon the
public employee, no right to strike under the fourteenth amendment can
be found.
D. Bill of Attainder
Although not raised in ChiefJustice Bird's concurring opinion, a fi-
nal constitutional challenge involves objections based upon a bill of at-
tainder argument.1 74 In light of significant precedent, 175 it appears that
such arguments also fail.
In Di Maggio v. Brown 176 petitioners claimed that a statute which ex-
pressly barred public sector strikes was unconstitutional on its face be-
cause it constituted a bill of attainder, imposing excessive fines and
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.1 77 The Di Maggio court summa-
rily rejected this argument. The court concluded that, in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Cummings v. Missouri, 1 78 the statute could not
reasonably be said to constitute a bill of attainder.1 79 As noted in Blount,
where no constitutional provision vests an individual with the right to
government employment or confers a right to strike, the government
may impose reasonable limitations upon conditions of employment.1 80
Consequently, a statute that incorporates such limitations upon govern-
ment employment cannot be construed as a bill of attainder.
IV. Conclusion
Despite the expansive growth of the government into areas consid-
ered by some to be nontraditional and notwithstanding our rapidly
changing socio-economic structure, public employees have no common
law or constitutional right to strike. In the absence of a statute confer-
ring such right, public sector employee strikes continue to be illegal.
The contrary opinion of the California Supreme Court in County Sanita-
173 See Dorchy, 272 U.S. 306, supra note 154 and accompanying text.
174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. A bill of attainder is generally defined as a legislative act allegedly
directed at a designated person, pronouncing him guilty of an alleged crime, without trial or convic-
tion according to recognized rules of procedure, and passing judgement and attainder upon him.
175 Di Maggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 225 N.E.2d 871 (1967); Abbott v. Myers, 20 Ohio App.
2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869, supra notes 144 & 169.
176 See supra note 175.
177 19 N.Y.2d at 287-88, 225 N.E.2d at 873. Di Maggio involved a proceeding instituted by over
100 ferryboat officers to review a determination made by the N.Y. Department of Marine and Avia-
tion. The determination found that the operators had violated § 108 of the Condon-Wadlin Act,
which prohibited strikes by public employees and imposed certain penalities. The court remanded
the case for rehearing on other grounds.
178 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). Cummings involved the indictment and conviction of a
Catholic priest for not taking an oath required by the state constitution. The Court determined that
the provisions of the Missouri Constitution which were challenged constituted a bill of attainder.
179 19 N.Y.2d at 287-88, 225 N.E.2d at 873.
180 325 F. Supp. at 883.
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tion District (No. 2) v. Los Angeles County Employees Association represents a
minority view. The recent opinion by the United States Supreme Court
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority supports this conten-
tion and undermines much of the theoretical basis of the common law
argument advanced by the majority opinion in County Sanitation.
The constitutional arguments advanced by Judge Wright in his con-
curring opinion in United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, and by the
majority and concurring opinions in County Sanitation, attempting to con-
fer protected status upon such strikes, do not persuade. No right to
strike is enumerated in the United States Constitution and, accordingly,
the right to strike is not considered a fundamental right entitled to con-
stitutional insulation. The prohibition upon the right to strike, whether
challenged under the common law or the Constitution, remains intact
because it offends neither. In the absence of a statute or explicit consti-
tutional permission granted by the sovereign, public sector employee
strikes remain illegal.
Daniel P. Ryan
